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INTRODUCTION
Most people have a general sense of whether an activity is
unlawful but are unfamiliar with the details of the particular law that
1. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct 1683, 1697 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 52 [2015], No. 1, Art. 5
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol52/iss1/5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
makes it so. Take vehicle codes, for instance. If a motorist were to be
pulled over for improperly displaying a license plate, that motorist
would likely be unfamiliar with the vehicle code section detailing how
licenses are supposed to be displayed and would, albeit begrudgingly,
take the word of the officer that their license plate display was illegal.
This reliance seems reasonable; after all, the police are the people we
trust to know and enforce the law.
But what if the police officer is also unfamiliar with the law?
What if the license plate display was legally sufficient and the officer
wrote the motorist a ticket for what is not actually a violation? Or
worse, what if while speaking to the unjustly stopped motorist, the
officer spots illegal contraband in the backseat of the vehicle? Would
it be unreasonable for the officer to then cite or arrest the motorist for
the possession of illegal contraband? This might seem unfair, and
some people might even think the motorist's rights were violated, but
in a case with facts analogous to the preceding hypothetical, the
Supreme Court recently held that an officer's legal mistakes do not
necessarily violate a person's Fourth Amendment rights. In Heien v.
North Carolina,2 the Supreme Court rejected the former majority rule
that a mistake of law cannot be the basis for an officer's reasonable
suspicion. 3 Now, pursuant to the Heien decision, an objectively
reasonable mistake of law does comport with the Fourth Amendment.4
Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer needs at least
"reasonable suspicion" to initiate traffic stops.5  In determining
whether a police officer possessed reasonable suspicion, "the totality
of the circumstances-the whole picture-must be taken into
account." 6 Courts ask two questions when determining whether an
officer possessed reasonable suspicion.7 "The first part of the analysis
involves a determination of historical facts," which merely refers to an
examination of the facts and circumstances known to a police officer
2. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
3. Id. at 536.
4. Id.
5. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
6. U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981).
7. Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996).
80 [Vol. 52
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at the time of a stop.8 Courts have long held that police mistakes of
fact do not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment as long as the mistakes
are reasonable.9 The second part of the analysis involves identifying
"whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not
violated."' 0 In Heien, the Supreme Court explained that reasonable
mistakes of law made by police officers also do not run afoul of the
Fourth Amendment."
This note explains why the Heien Court erred in its holding. First,
and most importantly, the Heien Court erred because the justifications
for the former majority rule, which the court declined to follow, are
stronger than the justifications for the former minority rule. Second,
the Heien majority's standard is overly vague, making it difficult for
lower courts to apply the standard uniformly.
Section II provides a summary of the Heien facts, procedural
history, and majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Section III
argues for the adoption of the former majority rule based upon the two
reasons stated above. Section IV critiques the nebulous standard
announced by the majority, suggests that lower courts should instead
follow the Heien concurrence, and discusses how lower courts have
since applied Heien. Section V provides a conclusion and suggests
how lower courts should interpret and apply Heien.
I1. HEIEN v. NORTH CAROLINA
A. Facts and Procedural History
On April 29, 2009, Matt Darisse, a sergeant with a North Carolina
sheriffs department, observed Nicholas Heien's car pass him on the
interstate. 12 Sergeant Darisse began to follow the car because the
driver, Maynor Vasquez, appeared "very stiff and nervous."1 3 After
noticing the car's right brake light was not functioning, Sergeant
8. Id. at 696.
9. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
10. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014).
12. Id. at 534.
13. Id.
4
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Darisse pulled the car over. 14 Heien was in the backseat, and Heien's
friend, Vasquez, was in the driver's seat.' 5 The officer initially issued
Vasquez a warning, but suspicious of the two men's behavior and
inconsistent answers to his questions regarding their destination,
Sergeant Darisse prolonged the traffic stop.1 6  Sergeant Darisse
received Heien's consent to search the car and subsequently
discovered a bag of cocaine hidden in the vehicle.1 7
Sergeant Darisse arrested both men, and Heien was charged with
attempted trafficking in cocaine.' 8  Heien unsuccessfully moved to
suppress the cocaine - the trial court found that Sergeant Darisse had
reasonable suspicion to stop the car and that the subsequent search
was lawful.1 9 Heien pled guilty, reserving his right to appeal.20 On
appeal, the appellate court interpreted the relevant state vehicle code
statute21 as requiring only one working taillight, and it reversed the
denial of Heien's motion to suppress on the ground that the initial stop
violated the Fourth Amendment. 22 The state accepted the appellate
court's statutory interpretation and appealed only its finding of a
Fourth Amendment violation.23 Assuming the statute required only
one working brake light, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed
the appellate court's decision on the ground that the officer's mistake
of law was reasonable, and therefore, the stop did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.24 The case was remanded to the appellate court,
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 534-35.
19. Id. at 535.
20. Id.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-129(d) (West 2015) ("Every motor vehicle...
shall have all originally equipped rear lamps ... which lamps shall exhibit a red
light plainly visible .... ); id. § 20-129(g) ("[All motor vehicles] shall be equipped
with a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle ... . The stop lamp may be incorporated
into a unit with one or more other rear lamps.").
22. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 535.
23. Id.
24. Id.
82 [Vol. 52
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which then affirmed the denial of Heien's motion to suppress.25 After
the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, Heien petitioned for and
received a writ of certiorari.2 6
B. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Roberts and
joined by all except Justice Sotomayor, began its analysis by framing
the central issue of the case as "whether reasonable suspicion can rest
on a mistaken understanding of the scope of a legal prohibition." 27
The majority discussed the Fourth Amendment's tolerance for
mistakes of fact, so long as "the mistakes [are] those of reasonable
men." 28 According to the majority, because nothing in the Fourth
Amendment or the Court's precedent prohibited reasonable mistakes
of law, these types of mistakes should be treated like reasonable
mistakes of fact. An officer can therefore base reasonable suspicion on
either a mistake of fact or a mistake of law. 29
The majority cited founding-era cases as evidence that reasonable
mistakes of law were always tolerated, 30 using US. v. Riddle31 as its
primary example. In Riddle, Chief Justice Marshall stated, with
respect to probable cause, that "[a] doubt as to the true construction of
the law is as reasonable a cause for seizure as a doubt respecting the
fact." 32 Conceding that Riddle's reasoning is more analogous to the
modem qualified immunity doctrine, 33 and therefore not directly on
point, the majority nonetheless reasoned that no subsequent decision
of the Court has challenged its explanation that probable cause
"ecompasse[s] suspicion based on reasonable mistakes of both fact
and law." 34
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 536.
28. Id (quoting Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
29. Id
30. Id. at 536-37.
31. U.S. v. Riddle, 9 U.S. 311 (1809).
32. Id. at 313.
33. See Section IV(a), infra.
34. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 537.
6
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The majority further reasoned that its conclusion was supported
by a more recent case, Michigan v. DeFillippo.35 In DeFillippo, a
police officer arrested the defendant for violating a statute that (1)
authorized officers to stop and question individuals based on
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and (2) made it illegal for
individuals stopped under the statute to refuse to provide evidence of
identity. 36 The officer searched the defendant and found him to be in
possession of drugs.37 A state appellate court found the statute to be
unconstitutional and ordered the trial court to suppress the evidence.3 8
The Supreme Court held that "[t]he subsequently determined
invalidity of the Detroit ordinance ... does not undermine the validity
of the arrest made for violation of that ordinance, and the evidence
discovered in the search of respondent should not have been
suppressed." 39  Specifically, the Court found that the officer had
probable cause based on the facts, and that it would not have been
reasonable for him to have anticipated the law's unconstitutionality. 40
According to the Heien majority, its holding was consistent with
DeFillippo, whereas a contrary holding would have been "hard to
reconcile . . . ."41
In the next part of its analysis, the majority explained the contours
of a "reasonable" mistake of law:
The Fourth Amendment tolerates only reasonable mistakes, and
those mistakes-whether of fact or of law-must be objectively
reasonable. We do not examine the subjective understanding of the
particular officer involved. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). And the inquiry
is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of
35. Id. at 538 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979)).
36. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 33-34.
37. Id. at 34.
38. Id. at 34-35.
39. Id. at 40.
40. Id. at 37-38. As noted in Heien, however, the Court did imply that it
would be unreasonable for an officer to enforce an enacted statute that was "grossly
and flagrantly unconstitutional . . . ." Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538 (quoting DeFillippo,
443 U.S. at 38) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 538.
[Vol. 5284
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deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a
constitutional or statutory violation.42
The majority then applied its standard to Sergeant Darisse's
mistake and found the mistake to be objectively reasonable. 43  The
majority found it notable that, prior to Heien, no state appellate court
had interpreted the relevant statute.44 And, considering the complex
statutory interpretation in which the North Carolina appellate court
had engaged, the majority had "little difficulty concluding that the
officer's error of law was reasonable." 4 5 Since Sergeant Darisse's
mistake was reasonable, he thus had reasonable suspicion sufficient to
initiate the traffic stop. 46
C. Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Kagan and joined by
Justice Ginsburg, expanded upon two points made by the majority.
First, under the majority's standard, "an officer's 'subjective
understanding' [of a statute] is irrelevant[,]" and should not be
examined by courts.4 7 This rule precludes the government from
defending an officer's mistake of law on the ground that the officer
was poorly trained or unaware of the law.4 8
Second, the majority's standard is "more demanding" than the
qualified immunity standard, the latter of which protects "all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."4 9
According to Justice Kagan, a mistake of law will only be reasonable
when the statute at issue presents a difficult question of statutory
interpretation, which, she emphasized, will rarely occur.50  Justice
42. Id. at 539.
43. Id. at 540.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
50. Id.
8
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Kagan then explained the test for determining the reasonableness of a
mistake of law in her own words: "If the statute is genuinely
ambiguous, such that overturning the officer's judgment requires hard
interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake. But
if not, not." 5' The concurrence then examined the vehicle code statute
at issue in Heien and concluded it was sufficiently ambiguous such
that Sergeant Darisse's mistake of law was reasonable. 52
D. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor, the lone dissenter in Heien, concisely summed
up her position:
In short, there is nothing in our case law requiring us to hold that a
reasonable mistake of law can justify a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, and quite a bit suggesting just the opposite. I also see
nothing to be gained from such a holding, and much to be lost.53
Justice Sotomayor argued that a police officer's understanding of the
law should not be one of the "inputs" in a Fourth Amendment
"reasonableness" inquiry.54 Rather, the reasonableness of a search or
seizure should depend on "an officer's understanding of the facts
against the actual state of the law."55  In explaining the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry in its cases, the Supreme Court
has always emphasized the importance of taking an officer's
understanding of the facts into account but never an officer's
understanding of the law.56 Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority
for not addressing these cases but instead relying on "founding-era
customs and statutes and cases applying those statutes" that the
majority conceded were "not directly on point . . . ."5
51. Id.
52. Id. at 541-42.
53. Id. at 545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 542.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 542-43.
57. Id. at 545.
86 [Vol. 52
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Justice Sotomayor was also concerned the majority's holding
would "further erod[e] the Fourth Amendment's protection of civil
liberties in a context where that protection has already been wom
down."5 8  The Supreme Court has noted that investigative stops
(including traffic stops) are often negative experiences for citizens. 59
Allowing police officers to stop motorists so long as the officers'
misinterpretation of the law is reasonable will likely increase the
number of negative experiences. 60 Another "perverse effect" of the
majority's holding is that - by retroactively deciding whether an
officer's action was reasonable instead of interpreting the statute's
language - it may give police too great a role in defining ambiguous
laws.61
Additionally, according to the dissent, following the majority rule
would not hinder law enforcement efforts, as evidenced by the lack of
any significant impact on law enforcement efforts in the federal
circuits previously following the majority rule. 62  In addition, law
enforcement would not be hindered in the many states that have a
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.63 Finally, the dissent
criticized the majority's definition of a "reasonable mistake of law" as
not being sufficiently detailed.64 The majority's failure to sufficiently
explain what makes a mistake of law reasonable will only create
uncertainty in lower courts applying its holding.65
58. Id. at 543.
59. Id. (first quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968); then citing
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)).
60. Id. at 543-44, 546 ("One is left to wonder, however, why an innocent
citizen should be made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the law may
be susceptible to an interpretive question.").
61. Id. at 544.
62. Id. at 544-45.
63. Id..
64. Id. at 547.
65. Id.
10
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III. THE SUPREME COURT ERRED BY DECLINING TO FOLLOW THE
FORMER MAJORITY RULE, WHICH HAS STRONGER JUSTIFICATIONS
THAN THE FORMER MINORITY RULE
Prior to Heien, the majority rule provided that a police officer
could not base reasonable suspicion on a mistake of law. 66 Federal
circuits that had addressed the issue and subscribed to the majority
rule included the First Circuit, 67 Fourth Circuit,68 Fifth Circuit,69
Seventh Circuit,70 Ninth Circuit,71 Tenth Circuit, 72 and Eleventh
Circuit.73 States that had addressed the issue and subscribed to the
66. See U.S. v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1244 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Like most
of our sister circuits, we judge the facts against the correct interpretation of the law,
as opposed to any other interpretation, even if arguably a reasonable one."); State v.
Brown, 850 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Wis. 2014) ("[T]he rule that an officer's mistake of law
is not sufficient grounds for a stop is consistent with holdings from a substantial
majority of the state courts that have addressed the issue.").
67. See U.S. v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Stops premised on a
mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be
unconstitutional.").
68. See U.S. v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014) ("Nor do we
suggest that a police officer's mistake of law can support probable cause to conduct
a stop when the underlying conduct was not, in fact, illegal.").
69. See U.S. v. Raney, 633 F.3d 385, 390 (5th Cir. 2011) ("If the alleged
traffic violation forming the basis of the stop was not a violation of state law, there
is no objective basis for justifying the stop.").
70. See U.S. v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2006) ("We agree with
the majority of circuits to have considered the issue that a police officer's mistake of
law cannot support probable cause to conduct a stop.").
71. See U.S. v. Morales, 252 F.3d 1070, 1073 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[G]ood
faith but mistaken belief that motorist violated traffic laws does not justify stop
under the Fourth Amendment . . . .") (citing U.S. v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d 1101,
1106 (9th Cir. 2000)).
72. See U.S. v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2013)
(holding officer's mistake unreasonable where statute permitted left turns into the
outermost lane).
73. See U.S. v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2003)
("Because Officer Carter's mistake of law cannot provide the objective basis for
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, we conclude that the traffic stop at issue
violated the Fourth Amendment.").
[Vol. 5288
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former majority rule included Kansas, 74 Maryland,7 5 Minnesota,7 6
Ohio,77 and Wisconsin.78 Federal circuits that had addressed the issue
and held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by a police
officer's reasonable mistake of law (i.e., the former minority rule)
included the D.C. Circuit, 79 Third Circuit,80 and the Eighth Circuit.81
States that had addressed the issue and followed the former minority
rule included Arkansas, 82  Georgia, 83 MiSsissippi, 84  and North
74. See Martin v. Kan. Dept. of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008)
("We ... hold that an officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop
violative of the Fourth Amendment. . . .").
75. See Gilmore v. State, 42 A.3d 123, 131 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) ("[O]ur
review of cases from other jurisdictions persuades us that a mistake of law-unlike a
mistake of fact-cannot support a detention for a purported traffic violation.").
76. See State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823-24 (Minn. 2004) ("[W]e hold
that an officer's mistaken interpretation of a statute may not form the particularized
and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity necessary to justify a traffic
stop.").
77. See State v. Babcock, 992 N.E.2d 1215, 1219 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) ("[T]o
permit traffic stops founded upon an officer's mistake of law would defeat the
purpose of the exclusionary rule, for it would remove the incentive for police to
make certain that they properly understand the law that they are entrusted to enforce
and obey.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
78. See State v. Brown, 850 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Wis. 2014) ("[I]f the officers'
interpretation of the law were incorrect th[en] the stop would be unconstitutional
because a lawful stop cannot be predicated upon a mistake of law.") (internal
citation omitted).
79. See U.S. v. Southerland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[W]e
think it objectively reasonable for the officers to suspect that Southerland's
dashboard plate was in violation of Maryland law, even assuming they were
mistaken that the law required display of the front plate on the bumper.").
80. See U.S. v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 399-402 (3rd Cir. 2006) (holding
traffic stop based on mistake of law to be objectively reasonable even though the
officer's subjective interpretation of the statute was unreasonable).
81. See U.S. v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Any mistake of
law that results in a search or seizure, therefore, must be objectively reasonable to
avoid running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.").
82. See Travis v. State, 959 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ark. 1998) ("[A]ll that is required
is that the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred.
Whether the defendant is actually guilty of the traffic violation is for a jury or a
court to decide, and not an officer on the scene.") (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
12
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Carolina.8 5  Though blindly following a majority is generally not a
good idea, "the overwhelming acceptance of the position directly
opposite that taken by the [Heien] majority . . . should give us all
pause." 86
The Heien Court should have applied the former majority rule for
two reasons: (1) there was nothing to be gained from the Court's
decision to follow the former minority rule, and (2) the Heien decision
undermines public confidence in the police and courts. First, as Justice
Sotomayor pointed out, there was nothing to be gained by holding that
reasonable mistakes of law comport with the Fourth Amendment.
The police will not gain any advantage from the Heien holding. Even
before Heien, police possessed broad power to stop motorists. The
legal justification for initiating a traffic stop (i.e., reasonable
suspicion) requires 'considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence,' and 'obviously less' than is necessary
for probable cause."88  The subjective intentions of a police officer
initiating a traffic stop do not matter, so long as an actual offense is
observed. 89  However, even where a motorist does not actually
commit an offense, a stop is legally justified if the officer initiated the
83. See State v. Rheinlander, 649 S.E.2d 828, 829-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) ("If
the officer acting in good faith believes that an unlawful act has been committed, his
actions are not rendered improper by a later legal determination that the defendant's
actions were not a crime according to a technical legal definition or distinction
determined to exist in the penal statute.").
84. See Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss. 2008) ("[B]ased on the
totality of the circumstances with which Officer Moulds was confronted, including a
valid, reasonable belief that Moore was violating a traffic law, Officer Moulds had
sufficient probable cause to pull Moore over, although, as it turns out, Officer
Moulds based his belief of a traffic violation on a mistake of law.").
85. See State v. Barnard, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (N.C. 2008) ("It is irrelevant
that part of Officer Maltby's motivation for stopping defendant may have been a
perceived, though apparently non-existent, statutory violation of impeding traffic.").
86. State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 361 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
87. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 545 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
88. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (quoting U.S. v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
89. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
90 [Vol. 52
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stop based on a reasonable mistake of fact.90 A simple internet search
of a state's vehicle code will reveal a large number of traffic offenses
and vehicle regulations of which the average motorist is probably
unaware. Putting all of this together, one would be hard-pressed to
deny that the police can legally stop virtually any motorist.
Incredibly, the Heien majority found it wise to give police officers
a last-ditch defense in those instances where they exceed their already
broad power. Since the police will not significantly benefit from this
Supreme Court decision in their favor, it follows that society will also
not benefit. Truly, "[o]ne wonders how a citizen seeking to be law-
abiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these invasive,
frightening, and humiliating encounters could do so." 91
The Court downplays the risk that officers will use its holding to
purposely engage in "sloppy study of the laws [they are] duty-bound
to enforce . . . ."92 Yet, it seems apparent that the risk still exists. Had
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not tolerate police
mistakes of law, not only would there have been a clear incentive for
all police officers to better learn the law, but any incentive to exploit
potential ambiguities would have been eliminated. Nonetheless under
Heien, the possibility exists that some officers will interpret the
decision as giving them free rein to initiate traffic stops so long as
they can later attach a reasonable justification to it. However small
that risk may be, the majority should have found it unacceptable.
90. See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 534 ("An officer might, for example, stop a
motorist for traveling alone in a high-occupancy vehicle lane, only to discover upon
approaching the car that two children are slumped over asleep in the back seat. The
driver has not violated the law, but neither has the officer violated the Fourth
Amendment."); see also U.S. v. Cashman, 216 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2000). The officer
in Cashman pulled the defendant over for allegedly violating a statute prohibiting
the windshield of a vehicle from being "excessively cracked." Id at 586. The
defendant argued the crack in defendant's windshield did not fall within the
statutory definition of "excessive cracking," and thus the stop was unjustified. Id. at
587. The court disagreed, framing the issue not as "whether [defendant] was
actually guilty of committing a traffic offense by driving a vehicle with an
excessively cracked windshield," but as "whether it was reasonable for [the officer]
to believe that the windshield was cracked to an impermissible degree." Id (citing
U.S. v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 1996)). The court held that the officer did
have probable cause to justify the stop. Id.
91. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
92. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539-40.
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Additionally, it is unclear why, between the government and the
public, the public is the one that should have to shoulder the burden of
the police's legal mistakes. 93
The Heien decision not only serves no justifiable purpose, it also
undermines public confidence in the judiciary and law enforcement.
Heien likely conflicts with many citizens' understanding of the
traditional rule that "ignorance of the law is no excuse . ... .94 As one
court has noted, it would be fundamentally unfair to hold citizens to
this standard, yet allow police officers to be ignorant of the law. 95 The
following asymmetry illustrates this point: An off-duty police officer
(i.e., a regular citizen) can be ticketed for any vehicle code violation
he or she commits, even if the off-duty officer makes an objectively
reasonable mistake. 96  But when that same officer is on-duty and
initiates a traffic stop based on an objectively reasonable mistake of
law, the officer's ignorance of the law is a defense. 97
The majority addressed this argument, stating that the "true
symmetry" is that the government cannot impose liability based on a
mistake of law, just as a citizen cannot escape liability based on a
mistake of law. 9 8 In other words, the government would not have
been able to write Nicholas Heien a valid traffic ticket for a broken
taillight. While the Court's symmetry argument is logical, this
explanation requires more thought to understand than does the
common-sense maxim, which most people understand on its face.
The Court's explanation would likely provide little comfort to a
person in Nicholas Heien's position.
It is undeniable that police in America have been heavily
criticized over the past year.99 It is likely that public sentiment toward
93. Id. at 546 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94. Bryan v. U.S., 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998).
95. U.S. v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003).
96. Brief for Petitioner at 18, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014)
(No. 13-604), 2014 WL 2601475.
97. Id.
98. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
99. See, e.g., Tobias Salinger, Justice Department to Accuse Ferguson Police
Department of Making Discriminatory Stops of Blacks, Using Resulting Fines to
Balance Budget, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/feds-condemn-ferguson-mo-police-
92 [Vol. 52
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law enforcement will worsen following a Supreme Court decision that
appears to expand police power. The Heien decision has been
characterized as giving police "one more ready excuse to routinely
violate the laws of the land,"100 contributing to the "steady erosion of
the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures[,]" 101 and wrongly encouraging the police "to choose the
broadest possible range of plausible readings of any traffic law. ...
Besides furthering the disconnect between the general public and
law enforcement, the Heien decision may also affect public opinion of
the Supreme Court. A Gallup Poll suggests that public approval of the
Supreme Court has been dropping since mid-2009.10 3 Although it is
unclear whether that trend still exists, it would not be surprising if it
does given the recent line of decisions that has worn down Fourth
Amendment protections in favor of the police. In Plumhoff v.
Rickard,104 the Court held that police did not use excessive force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment when they fired their weapons
fifteen times into a suspect's fleeing vehicle, killing the driver and a
seemingly innocent passenger.105 Moreover, the Court noted that the
racial-bias-report-article-1.2134001; Yamiche Alcindor, Activists Protest Alleged
Chicago Police 'Black Sites', USA TODAY (Feb. 28, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/28/activists-protest-alleged-
chicago-police-black-sites/24180197/; Nolan Feeney, L.A. Police Say Homeless
Man Tried to Grab Gun Before Fatal Shooting, TIME (Mar. 2, 2015),
http://time.com/3729146/los-angeles-homeless-man-shooting/.
100. John W. Whitehead, Ignorance Is No Excuse for Wrongdoing, Unless
You're a Cop, RUTHERFORD INSTITUTE (Dec. 16, 2014),
https://www.rutherford.org/publicationsresources/john whiteheads commentary/ig
norance is no excuse for wrongdoing unlessyoure_a-cop.
101. Marjorie Cohn, Supreme Court Upholds Auto Stop With No Traffic
Violation, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
marjorie-cohn/supreme-court-upholds-aut b_6579916.html.
102. Dahlia Lithwick, The Supreme Court Ignores the Lessons of Ferguson,
SLATE (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsandpolitics/
jurisprudence/2014/12/heien v north carolina as the rest of thecountryworries
aboutpoliceoverreach.2.html.
103. Rebecca Riffkin, Americans' Approval of the Supreme Court Remains
Divided, GALLUP (July 14, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/172526/americans-
approval-supreme-court-remains-divided.aspx.
104. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014).
105. Id. at 2022-23.
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officers would have been entitled to qualified immunity even had
there been a violation. 0 6 In Navarette v. California,10 7 the Court held
that an anonymous tip that "bore adequate indicia of reliability" could
produce the reasonable suspicion needed to initiate a traffic stop. 08 In
Fernandez v. California,109 the Court narrowed a consent-related
restriction on police, holding that police did not violate the Fourth
Amendment where the defendant objected to police searching his
home, the police arrested and removed the defendant from the home,
and the police returned an hour later and searched the home after
receiving consent from the defendant's cohabitant.11 0  And in
Kentucky v. King,"' the Court held that police did not violate the
Fourth Amendment when they knocked on the door of an apartment
emanating the smell of marijuana, heard people begin to move inside,
and kicked in the door because they believed that evidence was about
to be destroyed." 2 People may group Heien with the preceding cases,
casting an even more negative light on the Court as a result.
Concededly, the United States federal court system is structured to
prevent public pressures from influencing judicial decisions.1 13 Under
the Constitution, Supreme Court justices are appointed for life, rather
than a term of years.11 4  This constitutional mandate "promote[s]
impartial adjudication by placing the judicial power of the United
106. Id. The Court also noted that the presence of a passenger in the vehicle
did not change the analysis because Fourth Amendment rights are personal. Id. at
2022.
107. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
108. Id. at 1688.
109. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014).
110. Id. at 1130-31, 1137.
111. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011).
112. Id. at 1854, 1863.
113. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("If the power of
making [judicial appointments] was committed ... to the people, or to persons
chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to
consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the
Constitution and the laws.").
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the
supreme Court[.]"); id., art III, § I ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ).
[Vol. 5294
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States in a body of judges insulated from majoritarian pressures and
thus able to enforce federal law without fear of reprisal or public
rebuke.""'
Nonetheless, research indicates the Supreme Court may actually
be influenced by public opinion." 6 This may be because "the Court
requires public support to remain an efficacious branch of
government,"' 17 or because the justices are people themselves and
"respond to the same events or forces that affect the opinion of other
members of the public."" 8  Either way, if in practice the Court is
influenced by public opinion, then the Court should have seized upon
Heien as an opportunity to draw a line in favor of the public. Given
the rise in anti-police sentiment following the high-profile police
shootings of unarmed men in places like Ferguson, Missouri," 9 which
left some questioning whether the United States was turning into a
police-state,120 a decision appearing to curtail police power would
have been well-received by the public.
115. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 860 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 704 (1980)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. See Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the
Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We're Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263
(2010) (discussing prior research concerning effect of public opinion on the
Supreme Court and explaining the results of the authors' own study).
117. Id. at 263-64.
118. Id. ("[A]s Cardozo once stated, '[t]he great tides and currents which
engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.'
(quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (Yale
Univ. Press 1921), http://www.constitution.org/cmt/cardozo/jud-proc.htm)).
119. Jack Healy, Ferguson, Still Tense, Grows Calmer, NY TIMES (Nov. 26,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/michael-brown-darren-wilson-
ferguson-protests.html.
120. See, e.g., John W. Whitehead, From Boston to Ferguson: Have We
Reached a Tipping Point in the American Police State?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/from-boston-to-ferguson-
h b_5679254.html.
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY CLARIFY
THE STANDARD
This section discusses the contours of a reasonable mistake of law
as defined by the majority and concurring opinions in Heien. It then
critiques the Heien majority for failing to sufficiently articulate a clear
standard and suggests that lower courts instead follow Justice Kagan's
more guiding concurrence. This section concludes by examining four
lower court cases, rendered after Heien, that dealt with the issue of
whether a mistake of law was reasonable.
A. What Is Not a Reasonable Mistake ofLaw: Qualified Immunity
and Mistakes Regarding the Fourth Amendment's Prohibitions
The majority stated that the reasonable mistake of law standard "is
not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of
deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a
constitutional or statutory violation."' 2 1 This section examines the
modem qualified immunity doctrine and analyzes the utility of
comparing it to the reasonable mistake of law standard.
The qualified immunity doctrine serves to protect public officials
"from harassment, distraction, and liability" when they act reasonably,
and to hold them accountable "when they exercise power
irresponsibly .... " 122 Officials are not liable for reasonable mistakes,
"whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law."' 23 As stated in
Heien, this doctrine "protects all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law."' 24
In Saucier v. Katz,' 25 the Supreme Court mandated a sequenced
two-part inquiry for courts to use in qualified immunity cases.1 26
Under Katz, courts had to first ask whether the alleged facts, viewed in
the light most favorable to the injured party, showed that a
121. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014).
122. Pearson v Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
123. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
124. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
126. Id. at 201.
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government agent violated a constitutional right of the injured
party. 12 7  If answered in the affirmative, courts would then ask
whether the right violated was "clearly established" at the time of the
agent's alleged misconduct.1 28  This mandatory sequence was
abandoned eight years later when the Supreme Court held that courts
could choose which question to address first.1 29  Because the first
inquiry involved difficult questions of constitutional law, many lower
courts, and sometimes the Supreme Court, began to start their
qualified immunity analyses with the second inquiry.1 30 In fact, in the
recent Supreme Court case of Carroll v. Carman, 3 ' the Court
described the qualified immunity rule almost entirely in terms of the
"clearly established" prong. 132
The trend in Supreme Court qualified immunity cases is to find
the officer immune from liability. 33 This is unsurprising, considering
127. Id.
12 8. Id.
129. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
130. See Susan Bendlin, Qualified Immunity: Protecting "All But the Plainly
Incompetent" (and Maybe Some of Them, too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1023, 1029
(2012).
131. Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014).
132. Id. at 350 ("A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to
qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. A right is clearly
established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right. In other words, existing
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.
This doctrine gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but
mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
133. A Westlaw search of Supreme Court cases for the term "qualified
immunity" revealed thirteen cases decided within the last three years. Of those,
seven cases involved a determination by the Court of whether an official was
qualifiedly immune. In five of those cases, the Court determined the official was
immune, and in the other two cases the Court suggested that the official should be
immune. See Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2096-97 (2012) (holding secret
service agents entitled to qualified immunity); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012,
2022-24 (2014) (holding officer entitled to qualified immunity); Stanton v. Sims,
134 S. Ct. 3, 7 (2013) (suggesting officer should receive qualified immunity upon
remand); Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1668 (2012) (suggesting private
attorney retained by the government should receive qualified immunity); Wood v.
20
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the doctrine protects officials against all but the most egregious
constitutional violations. None of this discussion is meant to suggest
that most officials are undeserving of qualified immunity. Rather, this
discussion serves to illustrate that the Heien majority's statement
regarding qualified immunity will not be helpful to lower courts.
Again, the Court stated that the reasonable mistake of law inquiry
"is not as forgiving as" the qualified immunity inquiry, 134 but as the
qualified immunity doctrine is almost entirely forgiving, it provides
little comparative value. Asserting that the mistake of law standard is
more difficult to meet than a standard that is almost always met is
inherently a bad comparison. For instance, an inquiry only slightly
more rigorous than the qualified immunity inquiry is technically "less
forgiving." The majority left it wholly unclear how much more
rigorous the analysis needs to be. For this reason, the Court's
reference to qualified immunity will likely prove of little value to
lower courts attempting to determine whether a mistake of law is
reasonable.
The majority also suggested that an officer's mistake concerning
the scope of the Fourth Amendment can never be reasonable: "An
officer's mistaken view that the conduct at issue did not give rise to . .
. a [Fourth Amendment] violation-no matter how reasonable-could
not change that ultimate conclusion."l 35 The Court was explaining
why it has only examined mistakes of law in remedy (e.g.,
exclusionary rule and qualified immunity) cases. Justice Kagan stated
this point more firmly in a footnote.1 36
B. What Is a Reasonable Mistake ofLaw: Sergeant Darisse's Mistake
While the Court did not lay out the specific contours of the
standard, Heien can be used by lower courts as an example of what
constitutes a reasonable mistake of law. In Heien, the relevant North
Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2014) (holding secret service agents entitled to
qualified immunity); Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 352 (2014) (holding officers entitled to
qualified immunity); Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2383 (2014) (holding
president of community college entitled to qualified immunity).
134. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014).
135. Id.
136. See id at 541 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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Carolina vehicle code statute was not clear on its face.137 Subsection
(d), titled "Rear Lamps," required all vehicles to have all of their "rear
lamps" (plural) functioning.138 Subsection (g) required all vehicles to
be equipped with a "stop lamp" (singular). 139 Subsection (g) further
stated that "[t]he stop lamp may be incorporated into a unit with one
or more other rear lamps."140 As pointed out by the Heien majority,
"[t]he use of 'other' suggests to the everyday reader of English that a
'stop lamp' is a type of 'rear lamp[,]"' and thus, read in conjunction
with Subsection (d), which required all rear lamps to be functioning,
an officer could reasonably think that all stop lamps (i.e., brake lights)
needed to be functioning as well.141 Given this construction, the
North Carolina appellate court was required to engage in relatively
complicated statutory interpretation. 142
In finding that Sergeant Darisse had made a reasonable mistake of
law, the majority also relied on the fact that the vehicle code statute
"had never been previously construed by North Carolina's appellate
courts."' 43 From the majority's reasoning there appears to be at least
two factors weighed when deciding whether a mistake of law is
reasonable: (1) the complexity of the statute at issue, and (2) whether
or not an appellate court has resolved the ambiguity in the statute. 144
These two considerations are characterized as "factors" because the
majority stopped short of stating that their presence was required in
order for a finding of objective reasonableness.
A large flaw in the majority's opinion is not readily apparent. The
majority found that Sergeant Darisse's mistake of law was reasonable,
in part, because the relevant North Carolina statute was unclear. 14 5
However, the majority did not state whether an ambiguous statute is
137. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-129 (West 2015).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
142. It is noteworthy that Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia did not think the
statute was ambiguous. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-49, Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604).
143. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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required to find a mistake of law reasonable. This leaves the door
open for a court to find a mistake of law reasonable under a more
general "totality of the circumstances" analysis.
A hypothetical similar to Heien is illustrative. Let's assume that
most people (civilians and police) think that driving with a broken
taillight is illegal. 4 6 In this hypothetical, the relevant statute clearly
provides that only one working taillight is required. If an officer who
is not aware of this statute initiates a traffic stop because a motorist
has one broken taillight, that officer's mistake may still be considered
objectively reasonable since most people assume that driving with a
broken taillight is illegal. There is nothing in the Heien majority's
opinion to suggest otherwise, leaving a void that can be abused by
police and construed by courts as permitting a "totality of the
circumstances" analysis.
C. Justice Kagan's Attempt to Clarify the Standard
In her concurrence, Justice Kagan attempted to fill the gaps left by
the majority. According to commentator Richard M. Re, the fact that
the majority did not need Justice Kagan's vote may suggest she wrote
her concurrence to "put her own spin" on the majority opinion, a term
Re calls "aspirational narrowing."l 4 7 Justice Kagan focused on one
major question that the majority failed to adequately address:
requirements for determining whether a mistake of law is
reasonable.1 4 8
Under Justice Kagan's approach, the test for determining whether
a mistake of law is reasonable is straightforward: if the statute is
genuinely ambiguous such that the court must engage in difficult
interpretative work, then the officer's mistake was reasonable.1 49
Though Justice Kagan described her concurrence as elaborating on the
146. Justice Hudson, the dissenter in the North Carolina Supreme Court,
agreed that this is a safe assumption. See State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 359 (N.C.
2012) (Hudson, J., dissenting).
147. See Richard M. Re, Can Justice Kagan Narrow Heien v. North
Carolina?, RE'S JUDICATA (Dec. 16, 2014), https://richardresjudicata.
wordpress.com/2014/12/16/can-justice-kagan-narrow-heien-v-north-carolina/.
148. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 541-42 (Kagan, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 541.
100 [Vol. 52
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majority's points, her requirement that there be an ambiguous statute
is nowhere in the majority opinion. One can only surmise whether
Justice Kagan actually believed she was "elaborating" or whether her
concurrence was a clever attempt to salvage the majority's lack of
direction. In any event, her concurrence provides more guidance than
the majority opinion, and consequently, should be used by lower
courts as the standard in mistake of law cases.
D. Review ofDecisions Made Subsequent to Heien
To date, few lower courts have applied the standard announced in
Heien. However, one Kansas appellate court decision applying Heien
illustrates the lack of clarity in the majority's standard. In State v.
Wilson,' the court examined the reasonableness of a traffic stop that
was initiated when an officer saw a car "beat the red light."' 5 ' The
officer stated that the defendant's car was approximately halfway over
the intersection line when the light turned red and continued through
the intersection after the light turned.1 52 The court found that the
defendant's conduct was not prohibited by the vehicle code, but held
that, under the totality of the circumstances and using common sense,
it was objectively reasonable for the officer to stop the defendant,
"even if [the officer] was mistaken about the law. . . ."153 The
dissenting justice took issue with the majority's application of the
standard:
This case is distinguishable from Helen [sic]. While the mistake of
law in Helen [sic] was due to a confusing statute, which gave the
officer fair leeway for enforcing the law, the statute here was clear.
The officer may well have believed he could stop the vehicle under
these facts but the law here stated clearly the vehicle was not
violating any law. Where the law is clear under these circumstances
the officer's belief in his own interpretation of the law does not
provide justification for the officer's action. Therefore, the stop was
150. State v. Wilson, 342 P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015).
151. Id. at 1-3.
152. Id. at 1.
153. Id. at 4.
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not justified and the subsequent search was inappropriate. The
evidence should be suppressed. 154
The dissenting justice appears to have either (1) placed
significance on the Heien majority's discussion of the ambiguity of
North Carolina's statute, or (2) followed Justice Kagan's concurrence,
in which Justice Kagan stated that a mistake of law will only occur
when a statute is sufficiently ambiguous.15 5 While the basis for the
dissent's reasoning is unclear, it does seem clear that the majority
applied the standard loosely at best, and incorrectly at worst. The
court found the officer's mistake reasonable despite never describing
the statute as ambiguous. Further, the court concluded, without
engaging the statute, that the defendant did not violate it. Notably, the
Wilson majority appeared to have ignored the Supreme Court's
explicit command not to examine the officer's subjective
understanding of the law. 1 5 6
An Indiana federal court recently noted, in dicta, that an officer's
mistake of law was reasonable.' 5 7 In Williams v. Brooks, an officer
pulled over a motorist for violating a state statute mandating the use of
turn signals before "turning or changing lanes." 5 8 The court found
the officer had probable cause to stop the motorist because the officer
reasonably believed the motorist did not activate his turn signal when
entering a dedicated left turn lane, which split from the inside lane. 159
The motorist argued that his conduct did not violate the statute
because he was not "changing" lanes; rather, he was entering an
additional lane of travel.1 6 0 In a footnote, the court addressed this
argument: "[E]ven if [the motorist's] interpretation of the Indiana
traffic statute is correct, and [the officer] was mistaken regarding
whether [the motorist's] actions actually violated a law, there was still
154. Id. (Pierron, J., dissenting).
155. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
156. See Wilson, 342 P.3d at 3 (discussing the officer's belief that attempting
to beat a light was in violation of the statute).
157. Williams v. Brooks, No. 1:13-cv-01592, 2015 WL 1013963 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 9,2015).
158. Id. at *10.
159. Id.at*1l.
160. Id. at *9.
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probable cause to initiate the traffic stop because the Court finds that
such a mistake would have been reasonable."'61
Although the Williams court made this statement in dicta, this
case is noteworthy because the statute at issue does not appear to be
ambiguous on its face.' 62  The court did not explain why such a
mistake would have been reasonable, likely because the court did not
need to reach the issue; however, it is surprising that the court made
this conclusion without analogizing the case to Heien.
The case of State v. Hurleyl63 presented a situation analogous to a
hypothetical Chief Justice Roberts posed during oral argument in
Heien.164  In Hurley, the officer stopped the defendant's vehicle
because there was an air freshener hanging from the rearview
mirror.1 65  The officer believed this violated a state statute titled
"Obstructing windshields,"l 66 despite the officer's concession that the
air freshener did not obstruct the defendant's view.1 67 The Vermont
Supreme Court acknowledged that the state trial courts were split on
the issue: some found the statute only prohibited hanging items that
161. Id. at *11 n.4 (citing Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539-40).
162. See IND. CODE ANN. § 9-21-8-25 (West 2015) ("A signal of intention to
turn right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last two
hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes.").
163. State v. Hurley, 2015 VT 46 (Vt. 2015)
164. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 34-35, Heien v. North Carolina, 135
S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604) ("Let's say you have two court of appeals decisions.
One says you need two brake lights; the other says you need one. Is it reasonable for
the officer to pull somebody over when one of their two brake lights is burned
out?"). In response, the attorney representing North Carolina stated that "it would
be reasonable then for the officer to decide which he thought was the better
rule . . . ." Id. at 35. In support of North Carolina, the assistant to the Solicitor
General answered the hypothetical by stating an officer would be bound by the court
of appeal in the officer's jurisdiction, and that if the officer's jurisdiction had not
addressed the question, but other jurisdictions had, no one court decision would be
dispositive. Id. at 50.
165. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, ¶ 3.
166. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1125 (West 2015) ("No person shall paste,
stick, or paint advertising matter or other things on or over any transparent part of a
motor vehicle windshield, vent windows, or side windows located immediately to
the left and right of the operator, nor hang any object, other than a rear view mirror,
in back of the windshield . . . .").
167. Hurley, 2015 VT 46, ¶ 3.
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obstructed the driver's view, while others found the statute prohibited
the hanging of any object.1 6 8 The Vermont Supreme Court adopted
the former view, which meant the defendant had not committed a
violation, and thus, the reasonableness of the officer's legal mistake
became an issue.' 69
The Vermont Supreme Court principally cited Justice Kagan's
concurrence for its statement of the law.1 70 Analogizing its case to
Heien, the court found the officer's mistake of law was reasonable,
citing the split in state trial courts as evidence of the complexity of the
statute.' 7 1  Though the court did not engage in any meaningful
analysis of the statute, this case indicates that lower courts may rely
on Justice Kagan's concurrence rather than the much vaguer majority
opinion, and Justice Kagan's "aspirational narrowing" may prove to
be successful.1 72
Lastly, the reasoning in Flint v. City of Milwaukee 73 presents an
ideal model for lower courts. The court stated the law in a manner
consistent with Justice Kagan's concurrence. In the district court's
view, an ambiguous statute is a "condition precedent" to asserting a
reasonable mistake of law defense.' 74 The court noted that instances
in which an officer makes a reasonable mistake of law are supposed to
be "exceedingly rare[,]" a point made by Justice Kagan but not the
Heien majority. ' In addition, the court made a point that was only
alluded to by the Heien concurrence and ignored by the majority: An
officer cannot make a reasonable mistake of law if the officer did not
168. Id. T 7. The defendant was pulled over in Bennington, Vermont. Id. 1 2.
The Vermont Supreme Court cited cases from trial courts in Chittenden and Rutland
as examples of the split of opinion on the statutory interpretation issue. Id. 7. It is
unclear whether the Bennington trial courts had previously interpreted the statute in
question.
169. Id. IT 19-20.
170. Id. IT 20-21.
171. Id.¶¶20-21.
172. See Re, supra note 147.
173. Flint v. City of Milwaukee, No. 14-CV-333, 2015 WL 1261245 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 20, 2015).
174. Id. at *23.
175. Id. (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 541 (2014) (Kagan,
J., concurring)).
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know the law in the first place. 176 This rule precludes officers from
creating a post hoc justification for their mistakes. For instance, in
Flint, officers executed a search warrant for the plaintiffs house
because they received information that the plaintiff illegally possessed
wild animals.' 7 7 The officers had a Department of Natural Resources
(DNR) official accompany them on the search because of the possible
presence of dangerous animals. 178  During the search, the DNR
official identified a turtle that was illegal to possess under a particular
state statute of which the police officers were unaware.179 The DNR
official erroneously told the officers that possession of the turtle was a
felony when it was actually a misdemeanor.180 The plaintiff was
charged with felony violation of the statute, resulting in more time
spent in custody and a higher bail than had the plaintiff been properly
charged. 181
The officers argued that had they known about the law and
analyzed it, they could have reasonably reached the same mistaken
conclusion that possession of the animal was a felony. 182 Because
determining whether the crime was a misdemeanor or felony required
analysis of two other statutes, the officers argued the analysis was
complex and analogous to the statutory analysis in Heien.183 The
court rejected this argument, stating "[o]fficers cannot shore up their
lack of knowledge by proposing that if they had properly reviewed the
law they would have been nonetheless confused, thus justifying their
mistake." 84 The court also disagreed that the need to examine three
statutes necessarily made the analysis "complex[,]" because "[s]tatutes
frequently cross-reference each other and require some effort to
connect the dots."185  Almost every mistake of law would be
176. Id. at *24.
177. Id. at *3-*6.
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id. at *16.
180. Id.
181. Id. at *19. The plaintiff was also charged under a second statute for a
felony when the officers admitted her conduct was likely a misdemeanor under the
same statute. Id. at *18.
182. Id. at *24.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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reasonable if statutory cross-referencing was a sufficient basis for
finding objective reasonableness.1 86 The Flint court ultimately found
the officers' mistake to be unreasonable.18 7  Moving forward, all
courts should analyze officer mistakes of law with the same level of
skepticism as did the Flint court.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court erred in Heien when they held that police
mistakes of law do not per se violate the Fourth Amendment. To
worsen the matter, the majority failed to articulate a clear standard for
determining whether a mistake of law is reasonable or not. The
majority emphasized that a mistake of law must be objectively
reasonable' 88 and made clear that the ambiguity of a statute supports a
finding of reasonableness, 189 but provided no further guidance. It is
wholly unclear, for instance, whether an ambiguous statute is a
prerequisite for a court to find a mistake "reasonable," or whether it is
a mere factor for consideration. The lack of direction provided by the
Court is puzzling given this decision directly affects the scope of
police power.
Only time will reveal whether the majority has produced a
workable standard, or whether, as Justice Sotomayor fears, the
majority's "conception of reasonableness in this context - which
remains undefined - will prove murky in application." 9 0 It is too
early to definitively say how courts will apply the Heien standard.
However, the probability of officer abuse may be lowered if lower
courts base their analyses on Justice Kagan's concurrence, which
provides more guidance than the majority opinion.
Lower courts should require "genuine[] ambigu[ity]"' 91 as a
"condition precedent to even asserting that a mistake of law is
reasonable." 92  When deciding whether a statute is sufficiently
ambiguous, courts should weigh factors such as the existence or lack
of a binding interpretation of the statute, whether there is a
186. Id.
187. Id. at *25.
188. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014).
189. Id. at 540.
190. Id. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
192. Flint, 2015 WL 1261245, at *23.
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jurisdictional split on the statute's interpretation, and the court's
objective judgment about the complexity of the statutory language
without regard to the officer's interpretation of the facts of the case.
With regard to the last factor, statutory cross-references should not be
given any weight because they are very common. Courts should then
identify more factors as unique situations present themselves.
As stated by the Heien majority and concurrence, some mistakes
of law, such as mistakes regarding the limits of the Fourth
Amendment itself, should be per se unreasonable.1 93  However,
mistakes resulting from an officer's nescience of a particular law
should also be per se unreasonable. This is appropriate because an
officer needs to understand a law in order for the officer's
interpretation of it to be reasonable.1 94  This would decrease the
number of traffic stops initiated when officers assume a law has been
broken but do not actually know what the law is. It may also
incentivize officers to become more familiar with their state's vehicle
code.
Given that police possessed broad power to initiate stops prior to
Heien, this decision may not have a large impact in practice, but it is
still a symbolic blow in the fight to preserve constitutional freedoms.
Even the most diligent citizen who spends the necessary time and
energy learning the law, and then obeys it, cannot ensure complete
avoidance of police contact due to an officer's mistake of law. While
the Court is unlikely to revisit this issue in the near future, hopefully it
will eventually overrule its decision in Heien and return to the former
majority rule endorsed by Justice Sotomayor. Until then, hopefully
law enforcement officials will not abuse Heien's implications and
courts will only find mistakes of law to be "reasonable" in the rarest
of circumstances.
Lorenzo G. Morales*
193. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539, 541 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring).
194. Flint, 2015 WL 1261245, at *24 ("[T]he officers did not know the law
and thus could not make a reasonable mistake about it.") (emphasis removed).
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